

U. S. Park Police Sequester Furloughs: Another Chapter In 30 Years of NPS Neglect

By *The Fraternal Order of Police, United States Park Police Labor Committee*

In his February 26, 2013 memorandum entitled, "Update on Preparations for Potential Sequestration", National Park Service (NPS), Director Jonathan Jarvis indicated that there could be across the board furloughs. In his March 8, 2013 memorandum on the sequestration Director Jarvis writes; "The sequester was designed to be inflexible. As a result, there can be differences in the needs for furloughs from activity to activity. Consequently, we do expect limited furloughs in the Service – specifically in the U.S. Park Police." In such a short period of time, it is quite a leap from across the board furloughs to apparently pretty much only the United States Park Police being furloughed in the NPS. The Director does not seem overly concerned about this and there seems no consideration given to the fact that United States Park Police (USPP) officers are essential employees who are tasked with the protection of life and property. When other employees are told to stay home when the government is closed for snow, hurricane and previous budget battles, USPP officers are required to report for duty. We are exploring some strange new territory when essential employees are furloughed and the rest of the NPS employees will be working, except for USPP's civilian workers. In the last budget battle, in the mid 1990's, USPP officers were required to come to work when pretty much everyone else in the NPS was forced to stay home.

The USPP doesn't have enough sworn officers to effectively accomplish the mission when all available officers are working. Therefore, on a day when a portion of the available officers are forced to stay home on furlough USPP operational effectiveness will be close to the breaking point. Furloughing officers from the understaffed USPP will have many effects; officers will wait longer for backup, areas already under-patrolled will receive less attention, response times to critical incidents lengthened and when pilots in USPP Aviation are furloughed perhaps there will be an interruption in our medevac system. If these furloughs are implemented we will have to hope that no one gets seriously injured when the Eagle cannot fly. However, it is foolish to base your safety on hope alone. A ride in the Eagle is often the difference between living and dying.

The targeted furlough of USPP officers is additional evidence of the long term neglect of the USPP mission by elements of the


NPS hierarchy. The majority of USPP officers have taken "judicial notice" that the mission of the USPP is not important to the NPS. A group of NPS bureaucrats have for more than 30 years ignored the needs of the USPP. For at least the last 30 years, the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP)- United States Park Police Labor Committee (PPLC) has continually lobbied for equitable pay, more personnel, better equipment, and better training for the United States Park Police. These efforts have been continually obstructed by some NPS bureaucrats and a few like-minded Congressional staffers. The individuals that make up this group have changed over time but, their agenda has not changed. This group minimizes the critical needs of the USPP to elected and appointed decision makers because they believe the USPP drains resources from their personal NPS budget priorities. The USPP is not the only law enforcement program neglected by the NPS. Our FOP brothers and sisters serving as law enforcement rangers are not a high priority either and they suffer from the same issues that confront USPP officers. The record of the last 30 or more years establishes, beyond any doubt, that the needs of the USPP are not high on the list of NPS priorities.

The Record

In the early 1980's, there was a white paper circulating, in the NPS, that outlined a plan for the elimination of the USPP. While the plan was never official, it was circulated service wide. A copy of it came into the possession of the leadership of the USPP bargaining unit that at the time was known as the Police Association of the District of Columbia. A key part of the plan was to hire law enforcement rangers to fill ranger positions in USPP patrol areas and have them slowly assume

law enforcement duties. During this time law enforcement certified rangers were hired in Greenbelt Park into interpretive ranger positions. While this plan was never officially acknowledged, USPP officers viewed the hiring of the law enforcement rangers in Greenbelt Park as evidence there were individuals in the NPS that were implementing the plan.

In 1985, the big issue the PPLC had with the USPP was that the radio system was unsafe. The USPP radio system that was installed for the Bicentennial in 1976 needed to be upgraded and
(NPS NEGLECT-Continued on Page 8)



USPP Officers standing watch over the National Mall from the Lincoln Memorial. The National Park Service won't allow the USPP to hire the officers needed to effectively protect the ICONS and the visitors to them.

(NPS NEGLECT--Continued from Page 7)

there wasn't funding. Around 1990 new portable radios were purchased but, the systems infrastructure was not upgraded until the end of the 1990's when the solid state tube technology was no longer available. Currently, the USPP is transitioning to a trunked radio system hosted by the Department of Justice. The system that the USPP is using now is unencrypted analog. The system has transmission quality and reliability issues. The USPP radio system was inadequate in 1985 and it is still inadequate today.

In 1993, a many of the larger police departments in the United States had computer systems for officers to prepare reports. On January 1, 2013, the USPP finally went online with a computerized reporting system dictated by the DOI. The PPLC has been asking for one since the early 1990's. However, the new reporting system (IMARS) is poorly designed and is not fully functional.

The USPP will be the only agency furloughed in the NPS. This is odd given that NPS budget officials have often described the USPP as "a particularly well funded" police department. If the USPP is "particularly well funded" than why is it the sole entity in the NPS facing furloughs? The reality is that the USPP is not a "particularly well funded" police department. A study done by the PPLC in the late 1990's, proved that the USPP budget per sworn officer position was the second lowest of the major police departments in the New York, District of Columbia and San Francisco metropolitan areas. A fact that would lead a reasonable person, at the very least, to conclude that the USPP was not "particularly well funded".

The official line of the NPS is that the USPP is being furloughed because 95% of the USPP's current budget goes to personnel expenses; the other 5% of the budget can't be cut by much because that pays for gas, copiers, computers, electricity, bullets, magazine subscriptions, event fencing and the like. The USPP being the sole entity in the NPS being furloughed is, at least, circumstantial evidence that the USPP is underfunded. The budget given to the USPP for non-personnel costs is bare bones. Who sets the budget for the USPP? The NPS. Who decides how much money there is for items other than personnel costs? The NPS. If the NPS had decided to increase the USPP budget by \$3,000,000 this fiscal year than our personnel costs would be less than 95% of the USPP's budget. The NPS sets the bar for the USPP budget. USPP personnel costs are 95% of our budget because the NPS does not allow the USPP to have much more than personnel costs. The non-personnel part of the USPP budget that is set by the NPS, is not sufficient to effectively accomplish the mission.

In the early 1990's, the PPLC, because of the growing terrorist threat, was concerned about the security of the monuments and memorials on the National Mall. In response, the PPLC began an effort to have vehicle barriers, alarm systems and video surveillance systems installed to improve the security of the structures and to better protect the visitors. After the bombing of New York City's World Trade Center on February 26, 1993, it was obvious to the PPLC that the United States was increasingly the target of terrorist attacks. The PPLC increased its efforts to obtain the security enhancements and began urging for patrol officers to be armed with rifles. The PPLC was concerned that in the event of a ground assault by terror cells that USPP officers would be outgunned. We wanted USPP officers to be able to effectively protect the visitors to the National Mall and the other areas patrolled by the USPP.

These efforts were increased after February 28, 1997; when the Los Angeles Police Department and two bank robbers wearing full body armor and armed with illegal automatic rifles exchanged

approximately 2000 rounds. LAPD officers were outgunned, for a time, by two criminals who wanted to get away. The initiative, bravery and devotion to duty of the officers saved the day. However, it was chilling to consider what a well armed terror cell unconcerned about escape would do to an area under the jurisdiction of a similarly armed USPP. What the PPLC was demanding then, is now called the "Patrol Rifle Program". The Patrol Rifle is now a pretty standard piece of police equipment throughout the United States. The PPLC's calls for rifles were ignored for many years until after 9-11 when many departments began such programs. It should be noted that the initial USPP Patrol Rifle Program was started by rifles that another federal agency was disposing of not from any funding from the NPS.

Throughout the 1990's and in the very early 2000's the PPLC continually contacted numerous officials in the executive and legislative branches of the United States government insisting that vehicle barriers, alarm systems and video surveillance systems be installed at the Monuments and Memorials; that the USPP needed more officers; better equipment and better training. The PPLC members who attended meetings regarding these issues remember the rolling eyes of many NPS bureaucrats when the PPLC would address these concerns. They did not consider them to be worthy of any consideration.

Until 9-11 the PPLC's pleas for better security were totally ignored with one exception. Shortly after the Oklahoma City bombing on April 19, 1995 then NPS, National Capital Region, Regional Director, Mr. Terry Carlstrom had jersey barriers installed just outside the flag ring of the Washington Monument. These barriers remained until the current barrier system was constructed in the aftermath of 9-11. The jersey barriers were the first visible sign that the PPLC's concerns had been considered. Reality and the PPLC's efforts had combined to convince Regional Director Carlstrom that he should give our recommendations serious consideration.

In 1996, without assistance from the NPS, the PPLC was able to get \$2,000,000 for the USPP for equipment in the [ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996 \(See Section 817\)](#), which was signed into law by President Clinton on April 24, 1996. Two days prior to the bills markup in the House of Representatives the NPS had not asked Congress for any money in the bill for security enhancements. Security was not on their list of concerns. USPP officers owe thanks to former Congressman Bill McCollum (R-FL) because he finally listened to the PPLC's concerns and took action. Rep. McCollum was the Crime Subcommittee's Chairman and he was able to get the USPP on the bill. While \$2,000,000 was far less than what was needed, it was \$2,000,000 more than the NPS requested.

In 1999, with the assistance of many individuals the PPLC was able to secure the passage of legislation that gave the USPP a pay raise. The pay raise effort was obstructed by many NPS officials and a small group of like-minded staffers on Capitol Hill. However, when the PPLC was able to gain the support of DOI Assistant Secretary John Berry (Policy, Management & Budget) and many members of Congress, we were able to prevail.

In 1999, Mr. Carlstrom (NCR Regional Director), who had become a strong supporter of increased security, contracted a consulting firm to do a security survey of the National Mall. The consulting firm of Booz, Allen & Hamilton (Booz-Allen) was selected to do the survey. Their report confirmed the long held position of the PPLC that the USPP did not have the personnel, equipment or

(NPS NEGLECT-Continued on Page 9)

(NPS NEGLECT--Continued from Page 8)

training required to adequately perform its mission. The Booz-Al- len report stated that the USPP needed more equipment, training and 820 officers. It should be noted that this report was published about 18 months prior to 9-11.

The NPS ignored the Booz- Allen report and have continued to ignore it to this day. Booz-Allen's facts would inconvenience their agenda. The Booz-Al- len report was ignored by the NPS but, the problems did not go away. The USPP's problems of personnel, equipment and training have persisted. They have been the USPP's companion for so long many officers think about them only when events take a turn for the worse. There have been periods of improvement but, it's a case of one step forward two steps back. The PPLC is not alone in the opinion that the Booz-Al- len report was ignored by the NPS. [In a report dated January 14, 2002, the DOI Inspector General stated:](#)

"Many of the issues uncovered in this assessment have been identified previously in past evaluations, reviews and assessments. In the last three years alone, the Department has spent in excess of \$1.5 million to have law enforcement programs assessed by consultants such as the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA), International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and Booz, Allen & Hamilton. The Department and Bureaus have demonstrated unwillingness, or inability, to recognize and address the thoughtful recommendations advanced by these professional law enforcement and management experts. The reports have been largely ignored and do little more than gather dust on a shelf."

While the PPLC agrees with the DOI Inspector General that the reports were ignored. We can't agree that the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) 2001 report is as thoughtful, practical or as comprehensive as the Booz-Al- len report.

The National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) never did a staffing analysis of the USPP even though they were contracted by the NPS to perform one and include it in their report. NAPA was sent to the USPP by the small group of like-minded congressional staff associates of NPS bureaucrats in 2001 and 2004. The 2001 Appropriations Bill directed that NAPA be contracted to study the USPP. NAPA empaneled experts, conducted a study and published their report. [NAPA's 2001 Report](#) contained many recommendations some obvious and practical, more than a few unworkable and damaging to the effectiveness of the USPP. When you read the report you would have thought that the NPS bureaucrats had wrote the document because it mirrored the notions oft spouted by them about the USPP's operation.

This was troubling but, not surprising considering the group that engineered the inclusion of the study into the Appropriations Bill. This like-minded group of bureaucrats and staffers considers the USPP to be a nuisance. NAPA's 2001 report discusses staffing at great length. However, in the final analysis NAPA avoided coming up with a hard number in their report. Here is their recommendation on staffing:

"A thorough staffing needs assessment based on the U.S. Park Police mission, as clarified, be performed. It should examine the balance among patrol activities, specialized units, and administrative assignments. The assessment should use primarily external expertise to ensure its objectivity and credibility, and the results should be addressed through the budget process recommended in Chapter 3." (Page: 70, 2001 NAPA)

Here is another part of NAPA's 2001 report:

"Academy staff have not conducted a comprehensive staff-

ing needs assessment and cannot determine a specific number of officer and civilian staff that the Park Police needs to effectively perform its current mix of missions. Given the net real reduction of 71 officer positions between 1995 and 2001, parts of USPP—including the Washington area districts, parts of the field offices, and CIB—have lost staff in the past few years. This can explain the stress that some officers said they are under to maintain coverage given their understanding and perceptions of their current roles.

The Panel is not convinced that the Park Police has done all that it can to manage its increased aggregate workload given its new responsibilities in New York and added monument coverage in the Washington area. Officer and civilian guard deployments have attempted to cover all missions to some degree, rather than to select priority areas—essentially, to base staffing decisions on some level of risk analysis. Rather, numerous organizations request or demand USPP services without considering their marginal costs. The Park Police has not done a risk analysis, but it appears to have chosen to reduce officer presence on the street in favor of other priorities." (Page: 69, 2001 NAPA) (Note: Take notice that "The Panel" only "appears" to know what the USPP have "chosen" to do and take great pain to never say how many officers the USPP needed.)

The PPLC was not convinced that the "Panel" (NAPA) had done all it could to complete its assigned task and manage its workload. The "Panel" did not emphasize that the USPP did not seek out these "new responsibilities" in New York, at Ellis Island and the Statue of Liberty. The NPS Director ordered the USPP to take over responsibility for policing these areas. Prior to the order NPS Ranger Personnel were responsible for these areas. The PPLC was against this expansion because we determined that these areas would increase the problems facing the USPP. The reason why this happened is that the NPS Superintendent of the Ellis Island and the Statue of Liberty had difficulty hiring certified law enforcement rangers. This forced the Superintendent to hire new personnel and pay to have them trained at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Brunswick, GA. The ranger trainees would return and work at Ellis Island and the Statue of Liberty until they had reached career status. Then they would apply for law enforcement ranger jobs at more attractive locations in the NPS. NPS managers at other parks scooped up these fully trained rangers and saved themselves the cost of training a new hire. The Superintendent of Ellis Island and the Statue of Liberty simply could not afford to be the training academy for the NPS law enforcement rangers and was tired of having trained personnel poached by other NPS units.

Why wasn't a "comprehensive staffing needs assessment" accomplished by NAPA? The PPLC contacted NAPA in 2001 for an explanation and asked, why was this task glossed over? While NAPA objected to the premise of the question they stated that they didn't have sufficient time and they couldn't because the USPP mission was not "clarified". The PPLC then stated to the NAPA staff that since they hadn't provided a staffing recommendation and had recommended that "external expertise" be secured to perform the analysis, that we were in luck, because Booz-Al- len had already conducted a staffing analysis that determined that the USPP needed at least 820 officers. A NAPA staffer replied that he didn't agree with Booz-Al- len's conclusion and questioned their methodology. The PPLC responded that Booz-Al- len was a highly respected consulting firm and they undoubtedly could justify their methodology. At this point, the conversation was essentially over. A check of NAPA's

(NPS NEGLECT-Continued on Page 11)

(NPS NEGLECT--Continued from Page 9)

2001 report will reveal that the only mention of the Booz, Allen and Hamilton, Inc. is in APPENDIX J, SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY:

"Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc. Counter-Terrorism Plan for National Park Service, National Capital Region. 1999." (Page 123)

Even a person who is not a certified public administrator knows that the number of employees needed to function would be an essential recommendation to include in a study of an organization. In today's parlance, NAPA "kicked the can down the road". NAPA's contract with the government specified that this piece of information was to be in the 2001 report. Why were they paid for this study, if they did not meet the terms of the contract? The PPLC suspects that they were not required to provide a staffing recommendation because the NPS bureaucrats did not want them to provide one. They did not want a hard number. Having a hard number could prevent them from acting on their notions regarding the USPP's mission. The NPS was concerned that an adequately staffed and equipped USPP would decrease the resources available for their particular budget priorities. You have to ask yourself if the NPS wasn't afraid of a hard number then why was the Booz-Allen report never discussed in the NAPA report and why has it been essentially ignored, in regards to USPP needs, till this day.

Currently, the USPP has approximately 641 sworn officers in DC, NY and CA. The NPS considers this to be too many. The PPLC has been told that the NPS has determined that the USPP needs 630 officers. In 1999, approximately 18 months prior to 9-11, Booz-Allen stated that the USPP needed 820 officers. Since 9-11 the U.S. Capitol Police and the United States Secret Service Uniformed Division have approximately doubled in size; the USPP has not. You have to wonder what methodology was used by the NPS to arrive at this number and who were the experts that performed the analysis? The PPLC is concerned that this NPS staffing number was determined by some questionable methodology because the PPLC is unaware of any "external expertise" secured "to ensure its objectivity and credibility". (NAPA Recommendation)

Additional evidence that the needs of the USPP are ignored by the NPS is that the number of USPP beats on the Washington, DC Parkways have not changed since the 1980's. The beats in USPP Washington, DC Districts 2, 3, 4 and 5 are the same as they were in the 1980's. The U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2012, Table 20. Large Metropolitan Statistical Areas—Population:1990 to 2010, Page: 28, establishes that the population of the Washington DC Metropolitan Area grew from 4.1 million in 1990 to 5.5 million in 2010. You would think that the 1.4 million more people in the area and the associated increase in vehicle traffic would have some effect on the number of officers needed to effectively patrol NPS lands in the Washington, DC Metropolitan Area but, it hasn't.

In 2004, the Congressional staff associates of the NPS bureaucracy had NAPA revisit the USPP to check up on their recommendations. Most of their recommendations had not been implemented. This is not surprising, after all, how can an organizational study that omits a staffing recommendation be taken seriously. [NAPA's 2004 Report](#) restates the 2001 Report, to include no hard staffing number. In the 2004 NAPA Report, you get the idea that NAPA was still very concerned about what agencies account pays for what activity. NAPA believes that the USPP should be reimbursed for escorting dignitaries traveling on NPS land. That the USPP's budget problems could be solved, in some part, by not escorting art for the Smithsonian --which to the PPLC's knowledge happens rarely---, by

doing less drug enforcement, by not escorting dignitaries and issuing less parking tickets. NAPA is concerned that these duties are somehow outside of the NPS mission. In this report, NAPA is clearly sensitive to the baseless theory held by many NPS bureaucrats that much of what the USPP does is outside of the NPS mission.

Should all of these USPP activities NAPA has issues with be eliminated tomorrow the problems with the USPP budget would not evaporate and the parks would become less safe. Monitoring cars parked in and around park areas is an essential part of patrol and counter-terror operations. Drug distribution activities in and around national parks endanger visitors and priceless cultural resources. When the robberies and sexual assaults occurred on the National Mall in 2006 it quickly became international news, does the NPS think that they were expeditiously solved by officers who had mostly security experience? The reality is that having officers capable of investigating and successfully prosecuting these serious crimes is a learning process that takes years.

Successful investigations of serious crimes often depend on the ability to work with other local, state and federal agencies. This is done by building relationships with other agencies by participating in task forces run by the FBI and other agencies. NAPA expressed concern that USPP officers serve on law enforcement task forces run by the FBI, DEA and ATF. In the past, the USPP's participation on these task forces gives the USPP (The NPS) quick access to the significant investigative resources (trained personnel and technology) available to agencies that participate. When investigations cross jurisdictional lines having officers from all area jurisdictions on one team clears investigative roadblocks. Additionally, other agencies on these task forces have investigative technologies, that up to this time have not been purchased by the USPP because of a lack of support by the NPS. Participation on the task forces gives the NPS quick access to those technologies at no cost.

Up until last week the USPP had two officers assigned to the FBI's SAFE STREETS Task Force. These two officers are no longer assigned to SAFE STREETS because they have been pulled back because of the furlough. Currently, the USPP only has two officers assigned to task forces addressing counter-terrorism. By severely limiting participation on task forces the USPP is limiting its ability to use the task force's capabilities, which over time will degrade its investigative capability. Officer's who are assigned to these task forces gain valuable investigative experience and build useful relationships that benefit the NPS. Many serious crimes that have occurred on NPS jurisdiction were successfully investigated because of task force resources and experience.

The PPLC is sensitive to the needs of government accountants but, if it needs to be done for National Security reasons does it really matter if the cost comes out of this agency's budget or that agency's budget. The USPP motors have been escorting the president since 1921. The logical gymnastics that have to be performed to construe that USPP officers escorting dignitaries over NPS lands, as outside the mission of the NPS would receive a perfect "10" in any Olympics.

The USPP Aviation section was established in April of 1973. The USPP Aviation Section has saved many lives, apprehended numerous criminals and performs many missions critical to National Security. They flew over the Pentagon on 9/11. On that day the USPP Eagle supported the missions of many federal and state agencies. To name a few the DOD, FBI, FAA, and USSS. No reasonable person would suggest that these activities were unrelated to

(NPS NEGLECT-Continued on Page 12)

(NPS NEGLECT--Continued from Page 11)
the mission of the NPS.

More than a few people, in the NPS Bureaucracy act as if the activities the USPP performs outside their myopic view of the USPP mission appeared out of the vapors. The USPP is part of the NPS and has been since 1933. Therefore, how can the operations of the USPP be outside the mission of the NPS. Add to this, [NPS, DIRECTOR'S ORDER #9: LAW ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM](#) Section 2.2 in part states:

"Outside Park Boundaries: The Service is also authorized to use appropriated funds for "Rendering of emergency rescue, fire fighting, and [other] cooperative assistance to nearby law enforcement and fire prevention agencies and for related purposes outside of the National Park System"(16 U.S.C. 1b(1)). Further, insofar as 16 U.S.C. 1b(1) does not confer arrest authority to NPS personnel who act outside park boundaries, State arrest authority is first needed before NPS personnel can enforce State law or engage in law enforcement activity outside national park system boundaries.

This authority will be used in emergency situations, only after first determining that such actions will facilitate the administration of the park or be an effective management tool for obtaining mutual assistance from other agencies. Furthermore, the authority is intended for use only in response to an unexpected occurrence that requires immediate action, which may include one or more of the following:

1. Emergency responses such as life or death incidents, serious injury/ fatality accident/ incident scenes, crime scenes involving the protection of human life, officer needs assistance, threats to health or safety of the public.

2. Emergency or law enforcement incidents directly affecting visitor safety or resource protection.

3. Probable-cause felonies and felonies committed in the presence of and observed by USPR, SA or USPP.

4. Misdemeanors committed in the presence of USPR, SA or USPP that present an immediate threat to the health and safety of the public.

The Service may not assume law enforcement responsibility outside of park boundaries (except in two exceptions relating to the USPP who under the District of Columbia Code 5-201 (2001) have the same police powers as the Metropolitan Police of the District of Columbia and were given police authorities under the District of Columbia Code 5-206 (2001) enabling them to act as police officers on all Federal reservations in nine counties and one city adjacent to the District of Columbia) in lieu of the legitimate responsibilities of nearby agencies. Cooperative assistance rendered to nearby law enforcement agencies outside of park boundaries should be limited to only those actions or efforts that support or assist those agencies."



USPP Motor:

Make, Model, Year?

Post your answer on the forum.



USPP Motors have been escorting the President since 1921.

It is nonsense to claim that escorting dignitaries traveling over NPS lands, a task that the USPP has performed for over 90 years is outside the NPS mission. The President and the Vice-President do not ride around all day sightseeing. What do the USPP motors do when they are not escorting dignitaries? They are patrolling NPS lands. This seems to be much more efficient use of government resources than having a dedicated unit of motorcycles standing around polishing their chrome, waiting for the next motorcade. Why do USPP motor officers have the expertise to escort the President and other dignitaries? They are well trained by officers who have escorted the President for years and they ride their machines everyday. They patrol on them, they respond to calls on them and they ride them in inclement weather. Riding a motorcycle in the President's motorcade requires precision riding skills and superior judgment. The required judgment and skill is not obtained overnight from a webinar, it is acquired over time on the street issuing traffic tickets, making arrests and responding to calls.



This person probably thinks having the USPP Aviation Unit available 24-7 is a wise expenditure of taxpayer dollars.

The USPP Aviation Unit gains the judgment and skill needed to safely operate in the airspace of our Nation's Capital in the same way as the motors. Just like the motors the aviation section is not waiting around for the next motorcade. They provide services that are essential in our Capital. Who would provide these services if the

(NPS NEGLECT-Continued on Page 13)

(NPS NEGLECT--Continued from Page 12)

USPP didn't, who would pay for them and would they do them as well? The NPS by rendering aid to other state and federal agencies gets a good deal in return. The NPS should contemplate the cost of paying for the fire and rescue services of the District of Columbia, Maryland and Virginia when they respond to NPS lands. It is safe to say that the NPS more than benefits from the relationships forged by the USPP over many decades.

Another area of concern to NAPA and the NPS is that USPP officers make arrests on DC city streets. This is seen as not benefiting the NPS mission. The fact is that arrests on city streets relate directly to the safety of park resources and visitors. For example, the area around the Frederick Douglass Home in SE Washington, DC is a known drug area. When USPP officers arrest criminals in the area of the Frederick Douglass Home they are making that facility and the visiting public safer. It is unrealistic to believe that this National Landmark Site is unaffected by the criminal activities that occur just outside of its fence. (Note: The Frederick Douglass Home is not adequately protected and its safety could greatly benefit by having modern security systems installed.) Crack Cocaine is not produced in the NPS areas of Washington, DC. However, it is sold and used in and near many NPS areas. To effectively combat this criminal activity requires enforcement operations in and near NPS areas. The USPP's ability to maintain low crime rates in NPS areas throughout Washington, DC is directly related to their authority to enforce laws on city streets. The USPP was given the same authority as the DC Metropolitan Police in 1882. The reason behind that expanded authority was that the USPP was ineffective at protecting the parks because they had no authority outside the parks. Criminals who were able to escape the boundaries of the park could not be apprehended by the USPP. Up until the 1970's, the USPP was not a proactive police department. However, in the 1970's in reaction to a rise in robberies and other crimes on the National Mall the USPP

became more proactive. The crime rate fell. Currently, robberies on the National Mall are rare in comparison to other areas in Washington, DC. The NPS's notion of the USPP mission would make the USPP less proactive and would lead to increased crime rates.

The NPS has at times expressed concern about the cost of the USPP's mission on NPS parkways and parks in Maryland and Virginia. There have been threats by the NPS to turn those areas over to the states. A threat thwarted by the fact that Maryland and Virginia were unwilling to take them. The reality is that the USPP's mission in NPS parks and parkways in Maryland and Virginia creates a force large enough and experienced enough for the NPS to effectively handle the large crowds that attend events on the National Mall. It should be noted that two NPS parkways provide access to and from Washington, DC to two major military bases. These two parkways were constructed mostly for National Security considerations. If the USPP abandoned the parkways and parks in Maryland and Virginia thereby, concentrating our efforts in the downtown area, the question is who will patrol them, where will the personnel necessary for large events on the National Mall be drawn and will it cost less money. USPP officers are effective in large part because the knowledge and judgment obtained by patrolling the diverse NPS areas in Washington, DC, Maryland and Virginia. The USPP currently gets assistance from other departments for some large events but, we can't always depend on outside help to meet operational requirements.

While there is much to disagree with in the 2004 NAPA report, it does arrive at a fundamental truth. On page 34 the Panel states:

"The Panel's most important message to all who make decisions about USPP resource needs ---including Congress--- is that you can't have it both ways. USPP cannot be expected to perform all its current functions ---- essentially a full service urban police department and guardian of national parks--- at current resource levels. If USPP is to do so, it needs additional resources to do so effectively."

This confirms the long held position of the PPLC, that the USPP does not have the personnel equipment and training needed to perform its mission. The NPS must accept the fact that they have to have it both ways and provide the resource levels because both missions policing and protection are intertwined. To do one to the exclusion of the other dooms the chances of doing either one effectively. Did the New York City Police Department or the DC Metropolitan Police Department stop providing police services after 9-11? They didn't, they obtained the resources needed for protection operations.

Furthermore, the NAPA reports "have it both ways" concept reflects a post 9-11 theory touted by some NPS and USPP officials that 9-11 "changed" the USPP's mission. That now the USPP's job was to protect the monuments and memorials (Buzzword: ICONS). This is confusing to the PPLC. The PPLC has always known that the protection of the ICONS and more importantly the visitors to them was the bedrock of the USPP's mission. The evidence of this is that the PPLC was asking for security systems, security barriers, equipment (e.g. patrol rifles, vehicles, etc.), better training and increased staffing for this purpose at least a decade prior to 9-11. The PPLC cannot grasp how anyone involved with USPP operations or budgeting before 9-11 could imagine that the protection of the ICONS was not part of the USPP mission.

USPP Chief Robert Langston retired on April 7, 2001 with his departure the USPP did not have a permanent Chief until the ar-

(NPS NEGLECT-Continued on Page 14)

*Obstructed by the NPS

(NPS NEGLECT--Continued from Page 13)

rival of Chief Teresa Chambers in February of 2002. Prior to Chief Chambers arrival the acting Chief's position was filled by the three Deputy Chiefs on a rotating basis. For many years, a repeated complaint of one congressional staffer about the USPP was that the "home grown" leadership of the USPP was "incompetent" and that giving them "all the money in the world" would not fix the USPP's problems. Shortly after Chief Langston's retirement the PPLC was approached by this staffer and asked if the PPLC would object to the hiring of a Chief from outside the department. The PPLC stated that there were some concerns but, if that would solve the problems facing the USPP than we wouldn't object. History has demonstrated that the USPP's problems have not been solved by hiring a Chief from outside the department. The reality is that no USPP Chief can succeed given the limited resources made available to the USPP by the NPS.

The Aftermath of 9-11 and Beyond

The sad reality is that the problems facing the USPP for more than 30 years are essentially unchanged. After 9-11 the vehicle barriers and a security camera system were installed on the National Mall. However, the camera system was under-designed and it was never up to the task. Even more concerning is that the systems minimal capabilities cannot be fully utilized because it has not been adequately maintained. Recently, upgrades have been made to the system but, the system is still inadequate. Security procedures, entry alarms and internal barrier systems for the "ICONS" and the National Mall have not been adequately addressed. The NPS will profess that they have spent plenty of money on this and that the USPP's incompetence is the root cause of the systems deficiencies. This question should be easily resolved by a comparative analysis of the cost of the USPP system (Installation, staffing, maintenance, staffing, etc.) and the cost of the security systems used by the US Capitol Police and the US Secret Service Uniformed Division. In fact, you would probably just have to visit the monitoring/control centers of the 3 agencies to come to a conclusion about the difference in the level of commitment to security and safety. Additionally, a comparative analysis should be done on the increases in staffing of these 3 agencies over the last 15 years to establish the level of commitment there is to security and safety. The hardening of the areas protected by the U. S. Capitol Police and the U. S. Secret Service Uniformed Division will very likely cause our enemies to look for softer targets nearby.

The USPP does not have the necessary forces to effectively respond to critical incidents on the National Mall. The lack of an effective monitoring system hampers effective protection of the resources and the visitors. The current model increased the number of foot patrol officers at some memorials from one officer before 9-11 to two after 9-11. It is vital for the USPP to have response forces located in several areas to quickly respond to incidents in order to deny access to critical areas at the ICONS. There also needs to be a mobile response force 24-7 equipped and staffed to respond immediately and effectively to trouble in the National Mall. The incident at the Holocaust Museum was a warning. These response forces will require hiring additional personnel and purchasing equipment.

The USPP currently has insufficient training, equipment and personnel to effectively respond to an active shooter scenario in our areas of responsibility. A lone shooter would stress the available resources to the breaking point. A coordinated group attack would be a catastrophe. Cutbacks in USPP staffing for any reason, would

further erode an already deficient capability. This is a serious matter because in these situations response delays of seconds would cost many lives.

Deficiencies in training, equipment and personnel have limited the USPP's ability to respond to and investigate serious criminal incidents. The success of criminal investigations is dependent on the quick arrival of sufficient personnel to secure the crime scene. Additionally, the success of investigations is directly related to the speed at which investigative personnel arrive at the crime scene and initiate the investigation. The investigators also need sufficient personnel and equipment to pursue aspects of the investigation as they arise. One example, of these deficiencies is that the USPP lacks the equipment and training needed to effectively secure digital evidence from digital devices. A July 2001 publication, [U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice publication, Title: Electronic Crime Scene Investigation - A Guide for First Responders](#), states: *"Managers have the responsibility of ensuring that personnel under their direction are adequately trained and equipped to properly handle electronic evidence."* (Page 1). This capability is seen as a basic need by the vast majority of law enforcement agencies since 2001. The safety and effectiveness of USPP operations is degraded by a continual lack of funds for equipment needed to conduct basic operations.

The IMARS (DOI Computerized Reporting System), ILEADS (DC Arrest Processing System) and TRACKER (USPP Evidence Tracking System) systems are not integrated. Therefore, processing arrests requires entering arrest data into three separate systems. The IMARS system is poorly designed; it is very far from intuitive. These issues complicate the reporting task. The result is that the implementation of IMARS and the lack of system integration have at least doubled the time required to complete reports and process arrests. Increasing the time officers spend completing reports decreases productive patrol time. This is a safety issue.

The USPP Aviation Unit urgently needs a replacement helicopter. One of the USPP's helicopters is quickly nearing the end of its operational usefulness (Over 20 Years Old). The safety and operational readiness of USPP helicopters is critical as they are an integral part of the critical incident response system in the nation's capital. This situation requires quick action and will require funding.

The National Mall and the ICONS need a public notification system that could direct people to safety during a critical incident. This will need funds to install, operate and maintain a system.

The USPP offices in New York and in California suffer from the same issues as the USPP in Washington, DC. They are having staffing issues that are, in some ways, worse than they are in Washington, DC.

Conclusion

The USPP's structure and the law enforcement tasks performed by its officers produces officers that are capable of effectively handling important tasks for the United States Government. For example, the USPP's contributions on 9-11, the cleanup the Occupy Movements encampment of McPherson Square ---after not being allowed to enforce camping regulations by the NPS--- and the policing of the numerous large events on the National Mall.

The record clearly establishes that the PPLC's judgment regarding NPS law enforcement needs is better than the judgment of the career bureaucrats that run the NPS. This statement is supported by the conclusions of two government funded studies and the historical record. The combined forces of the DOI, the NPS,

(NPS NEGLECT-Continued on Page 15)

(NPS NEGLECT--Continued from Page 14)

NAPA, the IACP, and Booz-Allen have not fixed the problems of the USPP in over 30 years. The inescapable conclusion of the historical record, culminating with the NPS's announced furlough of USPP officers, is that the bureaucracy in the NPS and DOI have created an environment that prevents effective law enforcement operations. The system is dysfunctional and needs to be fixed before our luck runs out.

The fact that within the core government area of our Nation's Capital that the USPP is the only police department being furloughed is troubling. The USPP is responsible for the protection of our nation's ICONS and the citizen's that visit them. The hardening of other targets in Washington, DC makes them an easier target. The USPP need the support necessary to perform their mission. In the immediate future, the PPLC will take action to inform key decision makers about the issues facing the USPP that have not been forwarded to them by the NPS. The furlough of USPP officers must be prevented. The USPP's effectiveness already suffers from a critical shortage of personnel due to the neglect of the NPS. Having even less officers available is risking a great deal. A solution to this problem must be found.

The impending furloughs are causing great concern in our workplace. The furlough is causing people to point fingers at the actions of other officers and units. Arrests are viewed as costing money (Overtime pay associated with processing and court). If we make no arrests than there will be less furlough days. If we just got rid of the helicopters we wouldn't have to be furloughed as many days. The NPS wants us to fight among ourselves because that takes away from our efforts to expose their neglect. The reality is that no matter what USPP officers do there will be consequences. If we make no arrests we will be criticized. If we make less arrests we will be criticized. More arrests --- we don't need more officers. Less arrests-- we don't need more officers. The same number of arrests - we don't need more officers. The furlough issue cannot be fixed by USPP officers altering their work habits.

The NPS has yet to address how the USPP will handle Independence Day festivities and many other large events given the furlough. One NPS official thought that they could get DC Metropolitan Police (MPD) to do the USPP's job on the 4th of July, its nice to know how much they care about USPP officers and their appreciation for our work. Did this NPS individual think that MPD would do it for free? Did they consider that MPD answers to the DC City Council and not to them? Did they consider that the interests of the DC City Council might be different than the federal government's? Think about this the next time you blame the aviation unit or fellow officers for the impact of the furlough. Blame the people responsible. Blame the people that didn't lift a finger or utter a word to Congress when they recently passed a bill exempting many federal law enforcement operations from the sequester but, not the USPP. Blame the NPS and the DOI.

We need to focus our attention on the people who are to blame and take action to get the problems facing the USPP resolved. We must stick together, be at the next meeting, get ready to write letters and make calls. Let's take action.

"Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did and it never will."
-- Frederick Douglass